He begins by comparing the "brigand" and the "man of power,"
stating that they are "probably at bottom very similar beings,"
except that the former acts against the community as a threat,
while the latter is enlisted by the community in its defense. And
they may, in fact, be one and the same, merely acting for and
against different communities, in the same sense that originally
the merchant and the pirate were not different, but often one and
the same. Nietzsche here sounds almost Veblenian:
"Even now, indeed, merchant's morality is really only a
_more prudent_ form of pirate's morality."
The similary between the brigand and the man of power is, of
course, that they are both strong, rather than weak, individuals-
-but their power, it is important to note, is not necessarily
entirely individual, but is necessarily augmented, is to some
degree collective in character, or "backed," if you will: that
is, a community may band together to form an equivalent power, in
itself, to counter an external threat, or it may enlist an
already existing equivalent power on its own side against that of
the other. Communities, according to N., almost always choose to
do the latter, rather than the former, in that "it holds _two_
dangerous beings in check," rather than merely one. Indeed, the
community is itself originally the product of just such a
balancing act:
"The community is originally the organization of the
weak for the production of an equilibrium with powers
that threaten it with danger."
But why for only "the production of an equilibrium," rather than
for "the production of proponderance," Nietzsche asks. Because to
seek the production of more than an equilibrium, an imbalance of
power in one's own favor, of proponderance, means to re-expose
oneself, the community, to danger, for it takes a much greater
power to overpower another power, than it takes to achieve a
balance between powers:
"An organization to produce preponderance would be more
advisable if the community could thereby become strong
enough to _destroy_ the threatening power once and for
all: and if it were a matter of a single powerful
depredator this would certainly be _attempted_. If,
however, he is the head of a clan or has a large
following, his speedy and decisive destruction is
unlikely to be accomplished and what is to be expected
is a long-drawn-out _feud_: but this state of things is
the least desirable one for the community, since it
must _deprive_ them of the time they need for the
provision of their subsistence...and be attended by the
ever-present threat that they will be deprived of all
the products of their labours."
This, itself, is the foundation of "justice":
_Equilibrium_ is thus a very important concept for the
oldest theory of law and morality: equilibrium is the
basis of justice."
Part of what interests me here is the implication that the strong
are "strong" partly, at least, due to their having gained a
backing or following from the weak. Many weak powers join
together behind a strong power in order to make themselves
stronger, with the consequence that the power they have backed
thus becomes, itself, stronger. At bottom, however, in both the
strong and the weak, the determining drive, will to power, is, as
Nietzsche makes clear in other places, a will to _preponderate_,
to overpower, and not in any sense a drive to equilibrate, to
make equal. Rather, the will to preponderate, whether embodied in
the collective will of a community, or personified in the person
of the "strong man," is inhibited only by the presence of a
counter-will that is equal or superior to it in force. Even so,
the "strong man" will be greatly less inhibited than the
community at large (the "organization of the weak") in that he
has no fear of losing his livelihood, but at most only a fear of
losing his life. He is only held in check by the natural tendency
of communities to align themselves with the weaker power against
the stronger, conditioned on their being able to thus equalize
them, rather with a stronger power against a weaker that might
prove, as ezploiter and tyrant, the greater threat. In the case
of a single, already preponderant, power without serious rivals,
the community will always, for its own safety, it seems to me,
align itself with it without reservation. Perhaps we can see here
some of the ground for the common sympathy with underdogs, as
well as the approbation that is generally reserved for
"frontrunners."
In this same section, Nietzsche goes on to sketch out the
origination of punishment as retribution:
"...against the preponderance which every criminal
promises himself it imposes a far greater counter-
weight, enforced imprisonment for acts of violence,
restitution and punitive fines for theft....the
transgressor is _reminded_ tht through his act he has
_excluded_ himself from the community and its moral
_advantages_: the community treats him as one who is
not equivalent, as one of the weak standing outside it;
that is why punishment is not only retribution but
contains something _more_, something of the _harshness
of the state of nature_, it is precisely _this_ that it
wants to _recall_.
This something "more" is the will to preponderate, or will to
power, as uncountered by any other will external to itself--in
punishing the criminal, who belongs himself, as Nietzsche makes
clear, to the species of the strong, in taking vengence against
him, the community seeks to expunge and destroy what can no
longer represent a threat. The whole bottle of spleen stored up
by the community may thus be, safely, spilled onto him.
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