>concerning your criticism of Heidegger and his, as you presume, 'robe trick'
> I'm not sure about that and feel myself moved to play the guardian angel.
>What I doubt is your connecting being - incontingence in reference to
>Heidegger. What Heidegger tried, to my mind, is asking for the true meaning
>of the sense of being and what that is 'being''. In his conviction there
>has been a misunderstanding and wrong questioning since centuries and
>therefore he, in my opinion, criticized the widly teached and none doubted
>connection being-incontingence you say he would assume. He tried to open the
>whole question anew by taking another way _not_ exactly knowing how the end
>would look like or if this was not the wrong way and method at all. However,
>he really made a difference between the things which are and the being itself
>he querried. This difference was exactly his _problem_ he tried to solve,
> and he thought the answers of tradition (being-incontingence) won't do.
>Heidegger's ontology is, for this reason, not to be confused with the aged
>answers of metaphysics. (To get something of my feeling it is only neccessary
>to read the first pages of 'Being and Time').
I've been involved lately in a thread on the Heidegger list discussing the
significance of Heidegger's assertion that Dasein is interpretation "all the
way down" and whether that echoes or affirms the Nietzschean thesis. The
discussion has circled around whether understanding is merely another, say
primal, form or mode of interpretation, or whether understanding underlies
and precedes interpretation. There has also been a long detailed
argument/discussion of Heidegger's reasons for asserting Existence over
Essence, as opposed to Essence over Existence (the traditional metaphysical
position). It is impossible for me to repeat the arguments here that were
made on both sides, but the more orthodox "Heideggerian" position (that he
is just taking things as they are, for instance) was pretty strongly
challenged. Enough anyway to make me suspect that the Heidegger you refer to
(what I termed the "orthodox" Heidegger) may very well be a ruse. I agree
that the issue is not by any means decided, one way or the other. But I
think the issue is there.
>Later on you sent another mail and you wrote:
>
>> Still, there is a genuinely interesting philosophical problem .... That is
>that if being is contingent, it can't be contingent on anything other than
>being, in that what being was contingent on would itself then be being!
> Therefore being can only be contingent on itself, or "self-contingent," as I
>put it. Now I happen to relate this state of self-contingency to the notion
>of Peircean synechism (truth as continuity) which I think is entirely
>consistent with Nitzschean perspectivism, for instance. Truth is relational,
>in other words...<
>
>Puh! (difficult, not a trial to prove God's existence, but the contingency of
>being and relativism of truth). My first impression, some questions:
>
>1. Do you distinguish between the things which are and the 'being' -> not to
>my impression, but perhaps not neccessary at all?
I haven't mounted an argument for the contingency of being, but just pointed
out what I saw as a consequence of such a contingency if it should be
assumed. Now, I think one could say that to argue for the incontingency of
being would necessarily be to argue for two worlds, a metaphysical,
incontingent world (being) and a physical, contingent world (appearance),
etc. Nietzsche, I think, pretty affectively disassembles this, but I think
his base argument against it is not a matter of directly trying to disprove
it (for it can neither be proved nor disproved), but to confront the reader
with both what he sees as the ultimate consequences of the position
(Christo-Platonic nihilism, or world-denial as such) as well as alternative
naturalistic and psychological explanations and rationales for the position
that have the effect of undercutting it.
>2. Do you think it correct to make the trial of proving relativism of truth?
>Do you think it neccessary and why so?
Well, I think the problem is on the other side--it is _absolute_ truths that
can't be proven. The only "truths" we have are _relational_ truths (note, I
don't think this is necessarily the same thing as "relative" truth).
>
>3. And by proving, do you think you are in a line with Nietzsche?
The argument is from contingency. Thus, as you pointed out above, one would
have to decide for or against contingency. Deciding for contingency is to
reject absolute truth. However, I don't think absolute truth, as such, can
be disproven, any more than relative truth can be proven (or vice versa).
The primary argument for contingency would be that you are perfectly free to
accept the idea of the incontingency of being, but that you would not be
free to escape the consequences of that idea (Christo-Platonic nihilism,
world-denial, the assasination of life, etc.). Take your pick, in other
words. If you pick contingency, my argument follows.
>
>4. And, last but not least, if I myself make the trial to enter your
>argumentation (which I have not done yet), will I than be in a line with
>Nietzsche to your opinion?
>
I assume you are asking here whether I consider my argument to be present in
or anticipated by Nietzsche in some form. He certainly asserts the
contingency of being. I'm not aware of him making the particular argument
that I'm making, but I don't think it is inconsistent with his thinking.
Best,
Steve C.
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