> >Was ist gut? --Alles, was das Gefuehl der Macht, den Willen zur
> >Macht, die Macht selbst im Menschen erhoeht.
> >Was ist schlecht?--Alles, was aus der Schwaeche stammt.
> > --Antichrist, =A72
>
> >This, I suggest, just begs the question of what power and weakness are.=
I
> >know that sweet Lambda C will argue vociferously that this question has
> >been answered by Nietzsche's discussion of active and re-active forces.=
I
> >don't think this distinction as N. makes it valid, but let us for the s=
ake
> >of argument say that it is. Since N. assigns different values to activ=
e
> >and re-active forces, his use of these terms, I would suggest, amounts =
to a
> >re-naming of good and bad and good and evil. Re-naming is hardling an
> >overcoming of metaphysics, it is just a silly game of semantics.
>
> >Paul S. Rhodes
>
>
> The following is in response to Mr. Rhodes' latest intervention.
>
> The question arises as to whether active and reactive are synonymous or =
not with good
> and bad, which Mr. Rhodes promptly identifies with Good and Evil.
>
> An affirmative response, such as Mr. Rhodes suggests, would reduce the q=
uestion to a
> problem, not of semantics - as he pretends, but of mere transposition of=
terms or
> substitution. Semantics in fact concerns the meaning of terms, and if t=
here were no
> semantic problems with the notions of good and bad, or Good and Evil, th=
en one man's
> good would surely not be another man's evil, would it? If this much can=
be agreed
> (can it?), then there are indeed many problems with Mr. Rhodes reduction=
istic
> approach to the matter of active versus reactive (forces, affects, etc).=
To begin
> with there is the very connotation of force - does it mean that a force =
is bad when
> it is reactive? If reactive denotes a subjected force, what would becom=
e of active
> forces without object-forces that they could subject? One can certainly=
treat the
> quality of a digestive force as reactive, but can one seriously hold tha=
t digestive
> forces are 'bad' or 'Evil'? It is apparent the kind of nonsense one fal=
ls into when
> one reduces good and bad (adjectives) to Good and Evil (nouns), and then=
moves on to
> reduce active and reactive (as qualities of forces) to Good and Evil.
>
> The problem is that when one performs such a reduction and then dismisse=
s Nietzsche's
> distinction between forces with the papal slight of hand that it is mere=
moralistic
> transposition one has brought Nietzsche back to the old problem of the j=
udgement of
> God, exactly what he spent his life combating. Active and reactive are =
a matter of
> evaluation of forces, a matter of genealogy, not parameters of a moral j=
udgement
> against life, as Good and Evil are. Certainly the German type is digest=
ive, just as
> the entire Christian dualism of Good and Evil is reactive, is a tool of =
reactive
> life. But thereby organismic forces of digestion have not become German=
, anymore
> than reactive life is Christian per se!
>
> Mr. Rhodes' reductionistic suggestion also glosses over the evolution of=
morality.
> Already the distinction between good and bad is characteristic of origin=
ary culture,
> a savage invention: "it is the exalted, proud states of soul which are c=
onsidered
> distinguishing and determine the order of rank" (BGE, =A7260). The firs=
t type of
> morality concerns the determination of values and good and bad designate=
noble and
> ignoble as qualifiers of human beings, not actions. An act is neither g=
ood nor bad,
> let alone Good or Evil. To remind you of Spinoza's position on this mat=
ter, as it is
> precisely confluent with Nietzsche's, an action in itself cannot be said=
to be either
> good or bad; an act can be said to be good only if it compounds the rela=
tion of a
> body with other bodies, and bad only if it decomposes it. It is bad tha=
t which
> weakens my desire, the force of my will.
>
> At the limit, when savage culture yields to nomadism (our unbarbered ber=
bers...), one
> can discern the full extent of the active forces moving this first moral=
> determination from within: the fundamental statement of the Achean nobil=
ity of
> ancient Greece is - "I am good, therefore you are bad!" (Theognis poem).=
Hence, for
> a master morality, "the cowardly, the timid, the petty, and those who th=
ink of narrow
> utility are despised" (ibidem). In the age of Asiatic and City-States, =
the problem
> was not one of judging life, decrying life in order to promote values su=
perior to
> life. It was already the problem of combating reactive life.
>
> Altogether different is the second type of morality, slave-morality, the=
morality of
> reactive life. Here the great inversion of values is brought about: wha=
t is good
> becomes the image of Evil, and what is bad becomes the source of Good. =
The arts of
> the Priest and the Despot. Such is the caricature of will to power, its=
becoming
> lust for power, will for power, will to debase the other: "You are evil,=
therefore I
> am good!" How not to find in this triumph of reactive forces, the herd =
morality that
> weakens desire? For that is precisely the seat of all illusions, the ro=
ots of the
> dominion of Church, State and Capital! Good and Evil are both thoroughl=
y reactive
> notions, the implements of an entropic morality, the implements of a wea=
k life.
>
> Spinoza would argue that there is no Evil as such, as there is no adequa=
te idea
> possible of bodies that disagree; the only existence Evil could take wou=
ld be with
> respect to the affections of sadness (hatred, anger, resentment) that re=
sult from
> inadequate ideas and the repression of desire. Much as we have argued a=
bout the
> cosmological and ontological meaning of the Eternal Recurrence, (followi=
ng Deleuze's
> thread, undoubtedly!) to know that what returns is not reactive life, no=
r reactive
> forces, but active affections, Spinoza held that "from the standpoint of=
nature or
> God" and "their eternal laws" only relations that compound exist. Your =
depressing
> problem in reading Nietzsche stems precisely from your inability to real=
ize that Evil
> exists neither in the order of essences nor in the order of relations. =
Evil is
> nothing.
>
> But then, eh bien, parlons-nous en du Mal! One cannot but wonder what a=
ttracts you
> to Nietzsche, who you so vehemently abhor and denounce! Clearly, Nietzs=
che does not
> compound with you, he rather decomposes your body, threatens your faith =
in
> Christianity, saddens you. Can you not find in him that Great Outdoors,=
a breadth of
> fresh air sweeping through the stale chambers of academic scholarship an=
d the
> judgement of God, a hurricane rendering utterly meaningless the regurgit=
ated
> neo-modern snippets of this List and its cloacal extension? Do you hate=
idiosyncrasy
> (Deleuze's, Nietzsche's, etc) so much that you not only ignore it but mu=
st destroy
> it, reduce it, crumple it, caricaturize it?
>
> Is that why you speak of Evil then, to make this world yet more sinister=
? Aren't
> there enough of us basing our power upon the sadness we can inflict upon=
others, upon
> the diminution of the power of others? Hasn't Nietzsche been demeaned e=
nough by
> students of Philosophy, unable to befriend knowledge? What makes this l=
ist so
> uninviting? What is so tempting about its idiocy? Is it not the impote=
nce to
> communicate, the incapacity to take Nietzsche seriously, the need to rec=
uperate and
> reduce all disputes and rob them of their essence, that rules its thread=
s? The
> legacy of the Priest and the Despot: to convince us, to program us to ac=
t as if
> sadness was the promise of happiness, as if the cult of death, the cult =
of weakness,
> the cult of sadness were already a joy in and of themselves!
>
> Yes, Mr. Rhodes, it is bad all that proceeds from weakness, all that wea=
kens one's
> desire even further. After all, the cure of reactive life lies not in t=
hrowing it
> back to more unbridled reaction. What is bad is not reactive forces, bu=
t their
> triumph when they cease being enacted by active forces, when resistances=
cease being
> overcome. What is bad is negative, passive, reactive life, not reactive=
forces, but
> reactive forces that have subtracted themselves from the mastery of acti=
ve forces.
> Fortunately, human beings have not yet succeeded in assassinating the la=
st redoubt of
> active forces, their own unconscious activity; for the triumph of Good, =
as pure
> entropy of spirit, would surely preclude any possibility of freedom. Bu=
t they have
> come darn close.
>
> Bad is-
> "The ones who don't enjoy themselves even when they laugh..." The ones =
who say- you
> know what I mean but cannot say what they mean... "The ones who believe=
in
> everything, even in God. The ones who keep going, keep going , just to =
see where it
> all ends. Oh Yeaah!"
>
> When is the last time that our moralists adopted Nietzsche's concept of =
ethics? We
> don't recall...et pour cause.
>
> Good night ladies, ladies good night-
>
>
> Lambda C
>
>
> PS1 - "In this sense, existence is a test. But it is a physical or chem=
ical test, an
> experimentation, the contrary of a Judgement. (...) This is the ultima=
te difference
> between the good man and the bad man: the good or strong individual is t=
he one who
> exists so fully or so intensely that he has gained eternity in his lifet=
ime, so that
> death, always extensive, always external, is of little significance to h=
im."
> (Deleuze)
>
> PS2 - "Combat is not the judgement of god, but the way to finish with bo=
th god and
> every judgement. No one develops one's power by judgement, but by comba=
t - which
> implies no judgement whatsoever. Five characteristics seem to us to op=
pose
> existence to judgement: cruelty against infinite suffering, vigil or dru=
nkenness
> against dreams, vitality against organization, will to power against a w=
ant to
> dominate, combat against war." (Deleuze)
>
>
> --- from list nietzsche@jefferson.village.virginia.edu ---
>
To whom it may concern,
The previous posts seem to wrestle with an unstated issue, namely the
attitude which those participating in this discussoin group adopt
towards the thought of N. The explicit dispute reffers to the
"idiocy" of analysing N's thought through rationalist means in the
face of the fact that the body of work under consideration is
commited, above all, to render such analysis harmless, impotent. What
strikes me is that all that is left after this imposed impotence is
the personalities inherent in the responses. It is in the attitude
(as form, rather than content) that real appreciation of N. may be
reached.
Disputes between "participators" seem toi be what it is all about,
where each wields their own hammer while ironically cosying up to
one's neighbour.
Andrew
--- from list nietzsche@jefferson.village.virginia.edu ---