[sixties-l] Media and War, Appearance and Reality (fwd)

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Date: Thu Jan 17 2002 - 01:11:54 EST

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    Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 13:47:40 -0800
    From: radtimes <resist@best.com>
    Subject: Media and War, Appearance and Reality


    The following comes from Stratfor.com (Strategic forecasting).

    Media and War, Appearance and Reality


    Coverage of the "war on terrorism" has reversed the traditional role
    between the press and the military. Abandoning the hypercritical
    coverage of the past, the media have become cheerleaders -- allowing the
    conflict in Afghanistan to become synonymous with the war at large and
    portraying that war as an unalloyed success. The reversal of roles
    between media and military creates public expectations that can effect
    the prosecution of the war.


    The U.S. Department of Defense recently issued a report stating that the
    "war on terrorism" could last as long as six years on a global scale.
    Obviously no one, including the Defense Department, can predict anything
    that far into the future. A forecast of that sort is not intended as a
    precise benchmark. Rather, it is intended to say that the war is only
    just beginning and that victory, while attainable, will take a very long

    In a sense, the Defense Department is simply providing a benchmark in
    terms of its own rhythm of life. For example, U.S. defense undergoes
    what's called a "Quadrennial Review" (QR) -- a complete review of
    everything from strategy to weapons -- every four years. A QR was
    completed just prior to Sept. 11, and the next one will take place in
    2005. Defense officials are saying here that the war will not be over by
    the time of the next QR and that the next QR will still be focused on
    the war. Second, most serious budgeting takes place in less than a
    five-year horizon. The Defense Department is saying that all budgeting
    now and for the next couple of years will be focused on the war.

    All of this is in keeping with what the Bush administration, the Defense
    Department and the armed services have been saying since Sept. 11. The
    war is going to be long and hard -- and though its outcome will be
    certain, the enemy is intelligent, dedicated and resilient. The war in
    Afghanistan is merely the prelude for other military actions, and even
    in Afghanistan, it is far from over. Thus, this Defense Department
    report is entirely in keeping with what the administration has been
    saying on its own.

    In a paradox worthy of careful study, however, the mass media have been
    far more exuberant about progress in the war. The media have to a great
    extent disregarded the constant drumbeat of caution sounded by everyone
    from U.S. President George W. Bush to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
    to Adm. John Stufflebeem. Instead, they have spoken of the stunning
    victory of U.S. arms in Afghanistan and a new war-fighting paradigm in
    which air power, a few good men and the natives sweep away America's
    enemy, and they have generally engaged in an ongoing orgy of
    congratulatory coverage.

    The coverage of this war represents a new phase in American war
    journalism. In World War II, Korea and certainly Vietnam, the military's
    public affairs officers were charged with painting as positive a picture
    of events as possible. The media were institutionally dubious and
    suspicious. Among the myths of World War II was the notion that the
    media were far more positive in their coverage than they were in
    Vietnam. That was true to the extent that the media were as committed to
    the strategic goals of the war as the military in World War II, while in
    Vietnam, the media ultimately became critics of the war itself.

    But the coverage of specific battles, specific commanders and specific
    incidents in World War II was not only skeptical but also brutal. The
    most senior commanders worked diligently to keep reporters on their side
    because they knew how ready the press was to cast doubt on the
    competence of commanders. The media were committed to victory -- in
    contrast to Vietnam -- but they had no problem asking whether a given
    commander or campaign was likely to contribute to that victory.

    The media and military have now completely reversed roles. Anyone who
    listens to or reads the various briefings is struck by the tone of
    long-term confidence mixed with near-term concern. Anyone who watches TV
    coverage in particular, but who also reads much of the newspaper
    reporting, is struck by how that tone of caution is disregarded.

    One of the reasons for this has been the media's obsession with
    Afghanistan. Although it was, of course, the first major campaign of the
    war, it was far from the only operation. Throughout Europe, Asia and the
    United States, intelligence operations were under way that almost daily
    yielded an arrest here, a group captured there and so on. This war to
    disrupt the al Qaeda network was certainly as important, if not more so,
    than the war in Afghanistan, but it was a difficult war to cover.
    Afghanistan, by contrast, was relatively easy to cover. It had a
    geographical focus. There were air strikes to report and deploying
    troops to film. The media allowed a segment of the war, Afghanistan, to
    become identified with the war itself.

    But even here, the media could not cope with the subtleties of the war.
    The press interpreted events in Afghanistan as an overwhelming victory
    for the United States. It was certainly a victory but a qualified one
    and far from final, either in Afghanistan or in the war in general.

    The United States' primary war aim was stopping al Qaeda from using
    Afghanistan as a base of operations and, in particular, preventing al
    Qaeda from controlling its international network from Afghanistan. That
    goal was achieved. Another goal was the capture or liquidation of senior
    personnel in Afghanistan, preventing them from exfiltrating the country
    and setting up operations elsewhere. That goal does not appear to have
    been achieved.

    A very secondary goal was dislodging the Taliban from state power and
    destroying them as a fighting force. It should be recalled that this was
    not even a war goal in the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11. Washington
    was prepared to leave the Taliban regime in place if it surrendered al
    Qaeda and Osama bin Laden to the United States. It was only after the
    Taliban refused this demand that their destruction became a war goal --
    not as an end in itself, but as a means to achieve the primary end: al
    Qaeda's defeat.

    The Taliban's withdrawal from the major cities and surrender of state
    power was not the same as their destruction as a fighting force. This
    was a point made over and over by the Defense Department. The vast
    majority of the Taliban had not been killed or captured; most had
    escaped with their weapons. The military has consistently expressed
    concerns that the new government and the warlords who control
    Afghanistan now were not really committed to liquidating al Qaeda, let
    alone the Taliban, and that many of them were reaching agreements with
    individual Taliban members or leaders. The real issue is whether the
    Taliban might regroup over the winter, forge alliances with various
    warlords as they have in the past and re-emerge as a force.

    The media, in general, presented the Taliban's pre-Ramadan withdrawal
    from state power and the cities as the end of the Taliban. That
    certainly wasn't what the Bush administration was saying. The military
    was well aware of the importance of its victory but also of its limits.
    The U.S. military was aware that the few thousand troops it had on the
    ground were enough to conduct raids on al Qaeda facilities and to
    support native forces but not enough to crush the Taliban or to impose a
    Pax Americana on Afghanistan. They were also painfully aware of the
    limits of their intelligence and their dependence on local sources for
    intelligence, which meant frequently dubious information.

    Most important, they knew that both al Qaeda and the Taliban were
    receiving support and sanctuary across the border in Pakistan and that,
    as in Vietnam, cross-border operations were fraught with political

    For the media, once the Taliban abandoned the cities, the war in
    Afghanistan was simply over. In the following weeks, each unconfirmed
    sighting of Osama bin Laden, which however dubious, reasonably triggered
    a search operation by U.S. forces, led to completely unfounded reports
    that he was cornered and about to be captured. Regardless of the fact
    that this was not at all what either U.S. Central Command or the Defense
    Department was saying, regardless of all of the careful caveats and
    warnings, the media simply could not distinguish between raw
    intelligence being checked out and bin Laden's capture.

    In other words, the Defense Department and the media have "flipped"
    their roles. The military's public affairs officers, normally
    cheerleaders, have taken the role of scolding nannies, reminding the
    media that the war is going to be long and hard; the media has taken the
    role of cheerleader, creating a picture of a war filled with stunning
    and replicable victories.

    It is the expectation of replicable victories that is the most
    interesting. Afghanistan is a work in progress. We do not know whether
    the interim government led by Hamid Karzai can create a nation out of
    the warlords. We do not know whether the Taliban will re-form or what
    role they will play in the future of Afghanistan. We do not know what
    will happen across the border in Pakistan. We don't even know if al
    Qaeda will be permitted to resume operations in Afghanistan under the
    protection of some warlord. We do not know the final outcome even in
    Afghanistan. Therefore, the idea that what has happened there is
    replicable begs the question of whether there has been success in

    Whether Afghanistan is replicable depends on three things: Does any
    other country in the world have conditions like Afghanistan? Is the
    outcome in Afghanistan satisfactory? And what of the endless countries
    like Singapore, where al Qaeda is present, but in which nothing that has
    happened in Afghanistan is even vaguely relevant.

    Why have traditionally hypercritical media moved into a position where
    they are, on the whole, even more enthusiastic about the course of the
    war than the media's traditional enemy, the military? Why have the media
    tended to disregard the cautionary notes in favor of triumphalism? This
    is not a trivial question since, in some ways, from a military
    standpoint, raising false expectations is more dangerous than

    There are several reasons for this:

    * The media simply do not understand the war. The number of
    correspondents who have served in the military is trivial; the number
    who have been involved in or studied intelligence is even fewer. They
    are superb at doing human-interest stories on a war - - give them a
    refugee family, and they are good for a week. But understanding the
    decision-making within, say, the Taliban, and understanding what it is
    trying to achieve is simply beyond them.

    * The media confuse demons with morons. The media demonized bin Laden,
    al Qaeda and the Taliban. If they were devils, they were also stupid.
    The idea that the Taliban had a war plan and that they were executing it
    when they withdrew from the cities was simply beyond most of the media.
    The media are highly emotional, particularly when covering a major topic
    they don't really understand.

    * The media are highly dependent on experts. Because reporters
    themselves know very little about the subject, they have a great deal of
    difficulty identifying who an expert is. Any retired officer above the
    rank of lieutenant colonel is an expert. These officers are dedicated
    team players, even in retirement. All are positive about how well their
    particular service is doing.

    * Sept. 11 was partly an attack on New York, the media capital of the
    world. It created a particular mind-set within the media, one that took
    the war very personally. Reporters have a personal need to feel that the
    war has been brought under control, and they see every action as
    bringing them closer to safety.

    There are undoubtedly other and better explanations. The "why" is in
    many ways less important than that it is happening. The media are
    portraying victories where the military is portraying ongoing campaigns.
    This can affect the situation profoundly. The media shape public
    opinion. On the one hand, the war-fighters are working to prepare the
    public for an extended conflict. On the other hand, the media are
    presenting the war as a set of dramatic victories.

    In a sense, the media are doing the opposite of what they did in
    Vietnam, while at the same time potentially creating an identical
    situation: The public expects a quick end to the war and turns restive
    when it doesn't arrive in time for the evening news.

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