[sixties-l] [Fwd: ZNet Commentary / Doug Dowd / The New Economy? / Jan 31]

From: Ted Morgan (epm2@lehigh.edu)
Date: Thu Feb 01 2001 - 18:47:14 EST

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    Apropos of the discussion joined in by Bill, Marty....
    Ted Morgan

    -------- Original Message --------
    Subject: ZNet Commentary / Doug Dowd / The New Economy? / Jan 31
    Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2001 18:40:18 -0800
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    To: <znetcommentary@tao.ca>

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    THE NEW ERA OF THE 1920s AND THE NEW ECONOMY OF TODAY: BIRDS OF A
    FEATHER?
    by Doug Dowd

    The New Era began poorly, as did our New Economy (dating its take-off as
    the
    1990s). In 1919 there was a short recession, then a sharp inflation and
    unsteady good times and a very sharp recession, 1921-22; then began the
    so-called "prosperity decade," pulled up short only six years later. The
    1990s also began with recession; bouyancy began in 1993, mounting toward
    2000. As the two periods are now compared further, many similarities and
    contrasts with the present will jump off the page.

    "The times they are a changin'" fit the Twenties as much as it did the
    Sixties. The hoopla taking us into World War I had sent emotions
    singing;
    war's realities produced economic stimuli, but just as much
    disillusionment
    and decadence: changes rocked thrugh science and tehnology and the
    economy,
    and on into haute and popular culture and social mores (including the
    first
    major cracks in the nuclear family); and politics, always wolfish,
    became
    more so, requiring and producing the new art of public relations.

    Much of that was both facilitated and concealed because the Twenties
    were
    also the first hype decade -- hype about everything: entertainment,
    sports,
    fashion, politics, celebrities, free enterprise, and what would become
    consumerism: Hail the New Era!

    As in our own time, the hype paid little attention to the underside of
    what
    was celebrated: 1) the modern U.S. drug culture had its beginnings in
    the
    Twenties, tightly intertwined with jazzing nightclubs and the boozing
    and
    gangsterism of the time, the latter an outgrowth chiefly of the
    illegalization of booze (1919; repealed in 1933); 2) the rat-a-tat-tat
    of
    exploding mergers and acquisitions; 3) political corruption, always well
    dug
    in, plumbed new depths in the 1920s, from the White House on down (or
    up, as
    H.L. Mencken then put it); 4) soaring real estate and stock markets were
    matched by rising and spreading urban and rural poverty, alongside 5-10
    percent unemployment, 1921-29. Notwithstanding, the economy was seen in
    1928
    by the then leading economist (Irving Fisher) as "on a high and rising
    plateau." (That make you shiver a little?)

    A serious look around the world would have shown that the U.S. economy
    was
    not on a plateau but an island in a stormy sea.
    The much-vaunted "integrated world economy" of the 19th century was in a
    shambles in the 1920s: the UK averaged 10 percent unemployment for the
    entire decade; Germany had raging inflation (prices rising 4 trillion
    times,
    1914-1924) and associated political instability; the rest of Europe was
    also
    struggling with intractable economic problems, and with both revolution
    and
    counter-revolution; Latin American economies were sliding badly (as Wall
    St.
    called in loans, in favor of speculation at home); China's civil war had
    begun. Global chaos was king.

    Meanwhile, as both cause and result, lurking over the horizon was the
    worst
    depression in history, followed closely by the worst war. Given the
    gifts of
    nature, location and its other accidents of birth, the USA was going to
    be
    Numero Uno soon, no matter what; that we became so just when we did was
    an
    inexorable outcome of World War II and its aftermath. Strength and power
    are
    relative: before 1914, the gap between the U.S. and European economies
    was
    growing; the war, as beneficial to our economy as it was destructive to
    theirs, widened the gap to a Grand Canyon.

    The benefits of the war persisted well after 1918, due to substantial
    postwar pent-up demand for both consumer and investment goods and their
    new -- largely war-originating -- technologies, yielding the great
    expansion
    of the motor vehicle and other durable consumer goods industries. Though
    sustained for a while by the purchasing power enhanced by consumer debt
    and
    the roaring stock market -- sound familiar? --the key sectors
    (construction
    and autos) were already soft by 1926.
    ...................................
    What about now? As with the World War I, War II was again a major boon
    for
    the USA, both during and after; indeed, it was more than a "boon." Of
    all
    the industrial nations, ours was politically the most stable, and our
    economy the healthiest, strongest and technologically most advanced as
    the
    war ended, poised to become considerably more so; all the others, friend
    or
    foe, had been flattened.

    And then Providence, with a large boost from Uncle Sam, provided the
    Cold
    War, just in time to soften and end the recession of 1949. Cold War and
    hot
    war (first in Korea) combined to provide renewed expansion in the USA,
    creating or assisting the major bases for rising consumption and real
    investment. In addition, and at least as important, the Cold War was the
    foundation for the renewal of the European and Japanese economies, thus
    (given exploitation) bringing back to life and health the sine qua non
    of
    capitalism: an expanding global economy.

    The most striking contrast between the Twenties and today is found in
    that
    global economy. It was crumbling in the Twenties; whatever its recent
    troubles, it continues to thrive, always more integrated and expansive.
    Even
    so, there is a hard core of disturbing similarity today: in the
    Twenties,
    the USA was the only "healthy" economy in an otherwise sick world; in
    recent
    years we have been the healthy base upon which all other economies have
    depended. But a closer look shows that such "health" as we have depends
    upon
    the economic equivalent of addictive drugs.

    The USA sits at the center of a world in which the key factor for
    maintaining economic buoyancy for both major and minor economies is
    rising
    exports. The latter function in a complicated web whose strength or
    weakness
    is fully dependent upon the USA: "the consumer of last resort." U.S.
    consumption of the world's exports in the 1990s (and earlier) has been
    on an
    always rising trend; it must continue to be so, or the web will collapse
    for
    one and all. As this is written, consumption has begun to level off in
    the
    USA; even if that is the worst of what is on its way (which is
    unlikely), it
    must be remembered that continuous expansion in world trade is
    essential.
    Now some relevant data.

    IN 1980, the USA was the world's (and history's) largest creditor
    nation;
    ten years later, wwe the world's and history's largest debtor nation:
    our
    foreign debt now exceeds $3 trillion, and it rises at annual rate of
    $350
    billion. It must continue to do so; I know of no economists who think it
    can. That could signify nothing worse than a slowdown and moderate
    recession
    at some point. But it doesn't, for what has made the rise possible is
    not
    only foreign debt (which can be pulled back in a trice), but mountains
    of
    domestic debt.

    Thus: It is acknowledged that not only U.S. imports, but our
    consumption,
    productive investment and financial markets depend upon always rising
    and
    already astronomical debt; and, to repeat, that rise must continue if
    collapse is to be averted. The situation was worrisome enough in 1999 to
    cause Business Week (11-20-99) to ask, in its feature essay, "Is the
    United
    States Building a Debt Bomb?" -- and to answer "Yes." In analyzing all
    the
    debt areas noted above, they found that 1) consumer debt (excluding
    mortgages) now runs at over 100 percent of disposable income (as
    compared
    with 62 percent about 20 years ago); 2) non-financial corporate debt as
    a
    share of corporate output rose from 60 to 80 percent in those same
    years; 3)
    corporate debt, rising to finance buybacks of shares more than to
    finance
    productive investment, now equals 46 percent of GDP, compared with 38
    percent 6 years ago (NYT, 7-7-00); 4) financial debt as a share of GDP
    more
    than quadrupled, from under 20 to over 80 percent; financial companies
    are
    heavily into "repackaging" loans already made and selling them as bonds
    and
    notes (that is, borrowing on them), in amounts that rose from $2.4 to $7
    trillion, 1989-99 -- an amount greater than household debt and twice
    that of
    nonfinancial debt

    There are some nerve-wracking interdependencies whizzing around behind
    those
    numbers: the U.S. economy is now driven by consumption; consumption
    depends
    upon rising debt and the great Bull Market; an increasing percentage of
    stock purchases is done on margin; a significant percentage of those
    purchases depends upon credit cards and borrowing on home equities; the
    relative weakness of other economies and the atrractiveness of U.S.
    stocks
    and bonds has made it possible for our trade deficit to be fianced by an
    always rising inflow of foreign capital.

    Any slowdown in the USA -- and one has already begun -- will soon cause
    slowdown in most or all other economies -- to the degree that they are
    dependent upon our purchases (and our investments there); in turn that
    cannot be lead to a withdrawal from the USA of foreign capital, and....;
    and
    then, hold on to your hats.

    It is a commonplace that we lefties nourish a secret hope for another
    Big
    One. That may feel good; however.... Although (as Gramsci once put it)
    an
    economic crisis creates "a more favorable terrain" for our kind of
    analyses
    and politics, the following must be kept in mind:

    1) those hurt most by recessions/depressions are in the bottom 80
    percent of
    incomes, the poorest most of all; the rich are hurt least, if at all;

    2) the 1930s depression pushed no nation to the Left, except for a
    while. In
    the USA, FDR adopted center/right policies 1933- 1935 (the Nazis sent a
    delegation to study the NRA in 1934); the "Second" New Deal (1935-38)
    was
    pushed into place more from the bottom up than from the top down; and
    there
    were still 10 percent unemployed on Pearl Harbor Day;

    3) were there to be a serious recession soon, and that is more likely
    than
    not, we could expect worse than nothing from the Bush Administration and
    the
    largely conservative Congress, whose position on such matters is one of
    the
    larger similarities between the Twenties and now; and Europe too has
    been
    moving from center/left to center/right. (And Japan, 2nd largest economy
    in
    the world, has been mired in recession now for 10 years, its government
    paralyzed by ignorance and fear.)

    So, as always, the chances for a better rather than a worse society
    depend
    squarely on persistent hard and good work by all those left of center.
    It is
    not idle to suppose that there are many millions -- 5-10? -- in the USA
    who
    do or easily might think "left of center," and more than that if WE put
    in
    more of our time and effort to that end.

    So let's do it, already.



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