>Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2000 00:01:55 -0500 (CDT)
>From: "Mike Ruppert" <email@example.com>
>Subject: TAILWIND: CORRECTION TO SARIN GAS STORY, QUOTES FROM ADM MOORER
>I. In our original bulletin (6/23/00) and story on the shocking contents of
>the deposition of retired joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Thomas Moorer in the
>"Tailwind" story we wrote:
>"On June 7, 1998 CNN aired the "Tailwind" report as a feature news segment
>on their show "Newsstand." Reported by CNN veteran Peter Arnett, the stories
>stated that the CIA connected Studies and Observations Group (SOG), then
>commanded by CIA veteran and Army General John Singlaub, had used the lethal
>gas during covert operations into Laos. In particular, the "Tailwind" story
>reported that American defectors were the intended targets of the attacks."
>We should have written:
>"On June 7, 1998 CNN aired the "Tailwind" report as a feature news segment
>on the show "Newsstand." Reported by CNN veteran Peter Arnett, the stories
>stated that the CIA connected Studies and Observations Group (SOG) had used
>the lethal gas during covert operations into Laos. In particular, the
>"Tailwind" story reported that American defectors were the intended targets
>of the attacks. Having commanded SOG from 1966-68, and having maintained
>close contact with 1970 SOG Commander Col. John Sadler, Vietnam War icon
>General John Singlaub immediately led the charge to discredit the stories.
>According to Oliver, Singlaub has admitted in interrogatories that he
>periodically visited with Sadler around the time of the Tailwind missions.
>Singlaub is also a former Commander of the U.S. Army's Rocky Mountain
>Arsenal where most of the U.S. Sarin supply was produced."
>We apologize for the inaccuracy.
>II. Even though we have posted the deposition, in its entirety on the web at
>http://www.copvcia.com/PDF/MOORER.TXT a number of people have contacted us
>asking for specific citations of Moorer's discussion of a Joint Chief's of
>Staff Memorandum from 1970 and his reference to the use of the gas against
>potential American POWs as a "prophylactic" measure. We are happy to include
>the quotes below:
>In context with being questioned about an operational aspect of the Tailwind
>mission Moorer made the following statements under oath. Subsequently, he
>admitted that only certain function, like the deployment of nuclear weapons
>or poison gas required Presidential approval. Subsequent to that he
>acknowledged that he did not have actual control of the Tailwind missions.
>A This is from -- no, that's not mine.
> 3 "Hold until President sells with Moorer."
> 4 Q "Settles issue. Moorer."
> 5 A Huh?
> 6 Q No. Read it again. It says, "Hold
> 7 until President settles issue. Moorer."
> 8 A And this is to Vogt.
> 9 Q From who to Vogt?
> 10 A Well, I know you're trying to say it's
> 11 me, but I don't think so.
> 12 Q Who else was the Chairman of the Joint
> 13 Chiefs of Staff as of September 11, 1970?
> 14 MR. NYKODYM: Objection. Assumes facts
> 15 not in evidence.
> 16 A Who else? I just told you I had six
> 17 officers.
> 18 BY MR. SIMMONS:
> 19 Q Sir, you were the Chairman of the Joint
> 20 Chiefs of Staff?
> 21 A That's right.
> 22 Q And it indicates that as of 9/11, 1970,
> 1 something had to be held until the President
> 2 settled the issue, does it not?
> 3 MR. NYKODYM: Objection. Misstates the
> 4 record.
> 5 A Right. That's --
> 6 BY MR. SIMMONS:
> 7 Q Now, the troops are already there in
> 8 southern Laos as of that date, right?
> 9 A Well, they're there, but they have to be
> 10 moved. Laos is a big place.
> 11 Q Would you agree with me that if you
> 12 didn't write the words on there, "Hold until
> 13 President settles issue. Moorer," it was one of
> 14 your six people who reported to you?
> 15 MR. NYKODYM: Objection. Assumes facts
> 16 not in evidence.
> 17 A Well, the one that sent this to Vogt
> 18 had -- I mean -- rather, Vogt is -- he sent it to
> 19 somebody.
> 20 BY MR. SIMMONS:
> 21 Q Vogt was one of your aides or
> 22 assistants, and he had authority to transmit your
> 1 messages to others, right?
> 2 A Yes.
> 3 Q So when he says "Hold until President
> 4 settles issue. Moorer," he had authority from you
> 5 to communicate that message?
> 6 A And he's quoting me.
> 7 Q Who's DJS?
> 8 A It says, "Hold until President settles
>9 the issue."
>Moorer also agreed that the following quotes, taken from the deposition,
>accurately represented statements he made to Oliver when being questioned
>about the gas:
>Okay. "So that would include GB,
> 6 weaponized in the U.S. arsenal. We know we had 4
> 7 million pounds of it manufactured, and it was
> 8 stocked in NKP." "Yes." "But you are not going
> 9 to report that we were using some illegal weapon,
> 10 are you? Because remember, it wasn't technically
> 11 illegal yet."
> 12 "Oh, I know we hadn't ratified the
> 13 Geneva protocol yet. I remember you guys fighting
> 14 the war didn't want Congress to sign that, did
> 15 you?" "Well, if a country gets pressed in war, I
> 16 would be deterred by the existence" -- "I won't be
> 17 deterred by the existence of a treaty. In fact
> 18 they would be expected to do otherwise."
> 19 "My question to you then is, how much
> 20 was it used?" "You can't have a blanket rule on
> 21 that. You can't say, okay, we used it once in an
> 22 extreme situation, we know it works, now we can
> 1 never use it again. You have to look at each
> 2 situation. The keyword is survivability." I'll
> 3 come back to that. "You have to survive at all
> 4 costs. Treaty or no treaty. I guarantee no damn
> 5 treaty would have stopped me."
> 6 "So you're aware sarin was used?" "I am
> 7 not confirming for you that it was used. You have
> 8 told me that. But let me put it this way, it does
> 9 not surprise me. In an operation of this kind,
> 10 you must make certain that your men are so well
> 11 equipped for defensive purposes as possible. I
> 12 don't care if the treaty is ratified or not."
> 13 "So nerve gas was used in Vietnam, and
> 14 in all likelihood used more than once."
>As to the use of Sarin gas on defectors and downed American aircrews Moorer
>14 A I don't think so. "Turning now to
> 15 another subject matter, the gas. We discussed CBU
> 16 15, which is GB, which is sarin when we last met.
> 17 I have been talking to lots and lots of Air Force
> 18 people. And specifically to 30 different A1
> 19 pilots based at NKP. And they say that they had
> 20 this weapon and used it a lot on search and
> 21 rescue, SARs." That's right.
> 22 "The sun is going down. The pilot is
> 1 surrounded. In moments he will be captured and
> 2 killed. They drop the CBU 15. But what is
> 3 dramatic is that sometimes the pilot on the ground
> 4 might not have a gas mask. How would it be
> 5 decided to use such a weapon in that situation?"
> 6 "Well, the weapon had to be on the
> 7 airplane to begin with. The pilots would have had
> 8 sufficient information that this weapon was needed
> 9 to remove this threat. But the pilot would not
> 10 want to kill his objective -- the downed man. You
> 11 can't go dropping weapons like this willy-nilly."
> 12 "How do you decide whether to drop the
> 13 weapon?" "It depends on good communication
> 14 between the man on the ground. Hopefully the
> 15 pilot can tell you, I'm just behind the big oak
> 16 tree, up the hill. The pilots would have to know
> 17 they have a good chance of attacking without
> 18 killing him. There is no point in killing him
> 19 while trying to save him.
> 20 "The key to that decision depends on
> 21 sufficient communications to pinpoint his
> 22 position. And if that is the case, and they are
> 1 confident, then the attack would take place and
> 2 the helicopter would make the pickup while the
> 3 results of the attack is debilitating the enemy.
> 4 You would not want to use the weapon unless you
> 5 know exactly where he was. If he gets killed it's
> 6 a lost cause."
> 7 "But maybe not. Some describe a
> 8 situation in which the gas would be dropped
> 9 enemy," it says. "The sun is going down. The gas
> 10 could prevent the capture of another POW who would
> 11 then not give info to the enemy. And it would
> 12 kill a lot of enemy and keep them from gaining the
> 13 radios and other weapons on the aircraft. So the
> 14 pilots would drop the weapon in the hope of
> 15 preventing a capture, as a sort of prophylactic,
> 16 even if it killed the airman."
> 17 "Well, one important factor here is the
> 18 wind. It's important to talk to the pilots to
> 19 make sure you drop the weapon downwind. You
> 20 obviously want to drop downwind from where he is.
> 21 You want to make sure the wind is not blowing over
> 22 him. But the decision to use the weapon or not is
> 1 an on-the-scene decision. There are three or four
> 2 vital pieces of information what to do. And if
> 3 the wind is right and communication is good, I
>4 would be included to go ahead with the attack."
>Michael C. Ruppert
> From The Wilderness
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