From: radman (resist@best.com)
Date: Thu Jul 20 2000 - 21:12:20 CUT

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    >Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2000 00:01:55 -0500 (CDT)
    >From: "Mike Ruppert" <mruppert@copvcia.com>
    >I. In our original bulletin (6/23/00) and story on the shocking contents of
    >the deposition of retired joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Thomas Moorer in the
    >"Tailwind" story we wrote:
    >"On June 7, 1998 CNN aired the "Tailwind" report as a feature news segment
    >on their show "Newsstand." Reported by CNN veteran Peter Arnett, the stories
    >stated that the CIA connected Studies and Observations Group (SOG), then
    >commanded by CIA veteran and Army General John Singlaub, had used the lethal
    >gas during covert operations into Laos. In particular, the "Tailwind" story
    >reported that American defectors were the intended targets of the attacks."
    >We should have written:
    >"On June 7, 1998 CNN aired the "Tailwind" report as a feature news segment
    >on the show "Newsstand." Reported by CNN veteran Peter Arnett, the stories
    >stated that the CIA connected Studies and Observations Group (SOG) had used
    >the lethal gas during covert operations into Laos. In particular, the
    >"Tailwind" story reported that American defectors were the intended targets
    >of the attacks. Having commanded SOG from 1966-68, and having maintained
    >close contact with 1970 SOG Commander Col. John Sadler, Vietnam War icon
    >General John Singlaub immediately led the charge to discredit the stories.
    >According to Oliver, Singlaub has admitted in interrogatories that he
    >periodically visited with Sadler around the time of the Tailwind missions.
    >Singlaub is also a former Commander of the U.S. Army's Rocky Mountain
    >Arsenal where most of the U.S. Sarin supply was produced."
    >We apologize for the inaccuracy.
    >II. Even though we have posted the deposition, in its entirety on the web at
    >http://www.copvcia.com/PDF/MOORER.TXT a number of people have contacted us
    >asking for specific citations of Moorer's discussion of a Joint Chief's of
    >Staff Memorandum from 1970 and his reference to the use of the gas against
    >potential American POWs as a "prophylactic" measure. We are happy to include
    >the quotes below:
    >In context with being questioned about an operational aspect of the Tailwind
    >mission Moorer made the following statements under oath. Subsequently, he
    >admitted that only certain function, like the deployment of nuclear weapons
    >or poison gas required Presidential approval. Subsequent to that he
    >acknowledged that he did not have actual control of the Tailwind missions.
    >A This is from -- no, that's not mine.
    > 3 "Hold until President sells with Moorer."
    > 4 Q "Settles issue. Moorer."
    > 5 A Huh?
    > 6 Q No. Read it again. It says, "Hold
    > 7 until President settles issue. Moorer."
    > 8 A And this is to Vogt.
    > 9 Q From who to Vogt?
    > 10 A Well, I know you're trying to say it's
    > 11 me, but I don't think so.
    > 12 Q Who else was the Chairman of the Joint
    > 13 Chiefs of Staff as of September 11, 1970?
    > 14 MR. NYKODYM: Objection. Assumes facts
    > 15 not in evidence.
    > 16 A Who else? I just told you I had six
    > 17 officers.
    > 18 BY MR. SIMMONS:
    > 19 Q Sir, you were the Chairman of the Joint
    > 20 Chiefs of Staff?
    > 21 A That's right.
    > 22 Q And it indicates that as of 9/11, 1970,
    > 0267
    > 1 something had to be held until the President
    > 2 settled the issue, does it not?
    > 3 MR. NYKODYM: Objection. Misstates the
    > 4 record.
    > 5 A Right. That's --
    > 6 BY MR. SIMMONS:
    > 7 Q Now, the troops are already there in
    > 8 southern Laos as of that date, right?
    > 9 A Well, they're there, but they have to be
    > 10 moved. Laos is a big place.
    > 11 Q Would you agree with me that if you
    > 12 didn't write the words on there, "Hold until
    > 13 President settles issue. Moorer," it was one of
    > 14 your six people who reported to you?
    > 15 MR. NYKODYM: Objection. Assumes facts
    > 16 not in evidence.
    > 17 A Well, the one that sent this to Vogt
    > 18 had -- I mean -- rather, Vogt is -- he sent it to
    > 19 somebody.
    > 20 BY MR. SIMMONS:
    > 21 Q Vogt was one of your aides or
    > 22 assistants, and he had authority to transmit your
    > 0268
    > 1 messages to others, right?
    > 2 A Yes.
    > 3 Q So when he says "Hold until President
    > 4 settles issue. Moorer," he had authority from you
    > 5 to communicate that message?
    > 6 A And he's quoting me.
    > 7 Q Who's DJS?
    > 8 A It says, "Hold until President settles
    >9 the issue."
    >Moorer also agreed that the following quotes, taken from the deposition,
    >accurately represented statements he made to Oliver when being questioned
    >about the gas:
    >Okay. "So that would include GB,
    > 6 weaponized in the U.S. arsenal. We know we had 4
    > 7 million pounds of it manufactured, and it was
    > 8 stocked in NKP." "Yes." "But you are not going
    > 9 to report that we were using some illegal weapon,
    > 10 are you? Because remember, it wasn't technically
    > 11 illegal yet."
    > 12 "Oh, I know we hadn't ratified the
    > 13 Geneva protocol yet. I remember you guys fighting
    > 14 the war didn't want Congress to sign that, did
    > 15 you?" "Well, if a country gets pressed in war, I
    > 16 would be deterred by the existence" -- "I won't be
    > 17 deterred by the existence of a treaty. In fact
    > 18 they would be expected to do otherwise."
    > 19 "My question to you then is, how much
    > 20 was it used?" "You can't have a blanket rule on
    > 21 that. You can't say, okay, we used it once in an
    > 22 extreme situation, we know it works, now we can
    > 0300
    > 1 never use it again. You have to look at each
    > 2 situation. The keyword is survivability." I'll
    > 3 come back to that. "You have to survive at all
    > 4 costs. Treaty or no treaty. I guarantee no damn
    > 5 treaty would have stopped me."
    > 6 "So you're aware sarin was used?" "I am
    > 7 not confirming for you that it was used. You have
    > 8 told me that. But let me put it this way, it does
    > 9 not surprise me. In an operation of this kind,
    > 10 you must make certain that your men are so well
    > 11 equipped for defensive purposes as possible. I
    > 12 don't care if the treaty is ratified or not."
    > 13 "So nerve gas was used in Vietnam, and
    > 14 in all likelihood used more than once."
    >As to the use of Sarin gas on defectors and downed American aircrews Moorer
    >14 A I don't think so. "Turning now to
    > 15 another subject matter, the gas. We discussed CBU
    > 16 15, which is GB, which is sarin when we last met.
    > 17 I have been talking to lots and lots of Air Force
    > 18 people. And specifically to 30 different A1
    > 19 pilots based at NKP. And they say that they had
    > 20 this weapon and used it a lot on search and
    > 21 rescue, SARs." That's right.
    > 22 "The sun is going down. The pilot is
    > 0338
    > 1 surrounded. In moments he will be captured and
    > 2 killed. They drop the CBU 15. But what is
    > 3 dramatic is that sometimes the pilot on the ground
    > 4 might not have a gas mask. How would it be
    > 5 decided to use such a weapon in that situation?"
    > 6 "Well, the weapon had to be on the
    > 7 airplane to begin with. The pilots would have had
    > 8 sufficient information that this weapon was needed
    > 9 to remove this threat. But the pilot would not
    > 10 want to kill his objective -- the downed man. You
    > 11 can't go dropping weapons like this willy-nilly."
    > 12 "How do you decide whether to drop the
    > 13 weapon?" "It depends on good communication
    > 14 between the man on the ground. Hopefully the
    > 15 pilot can tell you, I'm just behind the big oak
    > 16 tree, up the hill. The pilots would have to know
    > 17 they have a good chance of attacking without
    > 18 killing him. There is no point in killing him
    > 19 while trying to save him.
    > 20 "The key to that decision depends on
    > 21 sufficient communications to pinpoint his
    > 22 position. And if that is the case, and they are
    > 0339
    > 1 confident, then the attack would take place and
    > 2 the helicopter would make the pickup while the
    > 3 results of the attack is debilitating the enemy.
    > 4 You would not want to use the weapon unless you
    > 5 know exactly where he was. If he gets killed it's
    > 6 a lost cause."
    > 7 "But maybe not. Some describe a
    > 8 situation in which the gas would be dropped
    > 9 enemy," it says. "The sun is going down. The gas
    > 10 could prevent the capture of another POW who would
    > 11 then not give info to the enemy. And it would
    > 12 kill a lot of enemy and keep them from gaining the
    > 13 radios and other weapons on the aircraft. So the
    > 14 pilots would drop the weapon in the hope of
    > 15 preventing a capture, as a sort of prophylactic,
    > 16 even if it killed the airman."
    > 17 "Well, one important factor here is the
    > 18 wind. It's important to talk to the pilots to
    > 19 make sure you drop the weapon downwind. You
    > 20 obviously want to drop downwind from where he is.
    > 21 You want to make sure the wind is not blowing over
    > 22 him. But the decision to use the weapon or not is
    > 0340
    > 1 an on-the-scene decision. There are three or four
    > 2 vital pieces of information what to do. And if
    > 3 the wind is right and communication is good, I
    >4 would be included to go ahead with the attack."
    >Michael C. Ruppert
    > From The Wilderness

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