Hmmm, this is getting busy! Since it's so relevant to the writing I'm
working on, I'll persist....
Re. periodization:
Michael Bibby is right, I think, to critique the white-middle-class bias
(& male) of much 60s history, and thus of the 'declensionist' view. I,
too am critical of this explanatory framework in that I argue the
democratic awakening & movement of empowerment that began in the 50s
didn't die out in the late 60s, it was very much in place in the women's
movement and the other liberation movements Michael recalls --and, in
this sense, I argue democratic awakenings of this type are always going
to happen in a culture of capitalism that has a contradictory
relationship with democracy (on the one hand "promising" liberation,
universality, etc.; on the other undermining, subverting, and
controlling the real force of democratization).
But on the three phases I suggest, my focus is on the awakening of
mobilization & activism, not on basic outlooks of different ages (or
other subgroups). The latter always exist, thus the inner city
populations Michael rightly refers to as not sharing the white middle
class idealism, etc. of the early 60s isn't a refutation of my
characterization of the mobilizing/activism going on in the early 60s.
Michael, I think, acknowledges that this characterization is roughly
accurate for the students and civil rights activism of the time. While
the inner-city, poorer population clearly had & has a different 'take'
on the system from this early-60s type, I would argue that it wasn't
particularly --or in a distinctive way-- mobilized during the early 60s
(though, yes, the NOI was active, Malcolm Little was becoming Malcolm X,
etc.); it was more typically resigned & fatalistic and/or sporadically
violent (gangs, "juvenile delinquency," etc.). BUT, in the middle 1960s
something was happening: the insurrections/riots began to occur,
Malcolm's speaking was having an impact, SDS' ERAP & Alinsky's Woodlawn
project, etc. was going on, inner-city black populations were becoming
more politicized thanks to the CRM, the War on Poverty was announced
with massive fanfare, CAP was agitating in a number of inner cities,
etc. So, during this 'phase,' a different quality of
mobilization/activism was beginning to emerge in a more signficant way;
I would characterize this mobilization (which, as I said earlier, is
also occurring elsewhere --antiwar...) as more radical, i.e., more
system-opposed or system-critical (rather than hopeful that the system
will respond & accommodate). This is why I argue a sea-change begins to
occur in the mid-60s (especially 64-65). Now, sure, there was radical
criticism and there were radicals in earlier movements, but I don't
think these were what distinguished the early-60s (or 50s, for that
matter), red-diaper babies aside --i.e., that 'coloration' of movement
hadn't taken off at these earlier points. [I'm not saying the r-d babies
weren't significant; they were hugely significant in influencing many
others, like myself, during what might be called formative years.]
And, as for the late-60s, though I don't see them through
'declensionist' lenses, I do think some things were happening that
helped (unwittingly) to speed the retrenchment of elites in power,
capitalist ideology, etc. And I think these things tended to revolve
around either (a) an "expressive" withdrawal from instrumental politics
(e.g, dropping out, seeking isolated "identity-construction," etc.) or
(b) an extreme, self-styled "revolutionary" instrumental politics (that,
in effect, dropped the 'pre-figurative' side of 60s democratic
politics). I DO see the war --and the system's intransigence-- as
particularly crucial in shaping this late-60s behavior; i.e., the
violence that permeated the culture had alot to do with the sharp
alienation of the latter counterculture; and the drive to end to the war
no matter what it took (e.g., by creating so much social chaos, they'd
have to get out) over-rode any broader movement-building objectives."
So these events & conditions had a lot to do with what happened in the
late 60s. Still (a) this is what captured most media attention & thus is
the media culture's "Sixties" that have been attacked & stigmatized ever
since; in reality, alot of personal liberation and important identity
reconstruction was going on (and, of course, the ecology movement was
taking off by the early 70s); these carried the democratic awakening
onward. And (b) the media coverage of the movement(s) played an
important role in all this. The media were closed off to radical
content. Anyone who wished to tell the American public, for example,
that the war in Vietnam was an immoral war of aggression created by
American foreign policy could not get this message through the media to
the larger public (person-to-person communication, however, helped do
this, along with independent media, stories that came back from Vietnam,
occasional photographs, books like Chomsky's American Power & the New
Mandarins & the revisionist cold war historians, etc.). What did get
through were the "newsworthy" manifestations of 'something happening
here' --which as Todd Gitlin has documented tended to be things like VC
flags, burning American flags, dramatic and/or violent outbursts, etc.
(helped, too, by agents provocateurs). I argue (cf. RHR reference,
below), that this movement-media dynamic had the effect of (a) creating
an illusory sense of empowerment in the broadened movement, while
simultaneously (b) alienating the broader culture from the movement
(even thought the broader culture was simultaneously becoming
increasingly alienated from the war).
Re. generations. Thanks to Robert for his critique. I agree that the
intra-generational shifts he refers to are more than 'metaphors.' I
think they reflect variations (over time) in the socializing impact of
conditions & events --as I've argued before, and as others have
suggested with a wider 'generational' sweep than I think applies. In
fact, Robert''s account provides good insight into the ways that
intra-movement dynamics were among the conditions & events that
socialized people. I just think that they were less important across
the board than the macro-events & conditions like the escalation of the
war, the inner-city explosions, and the skewed media coverage. The
third media trait --cooptive consumerism-- really takes off in
mid-to-late decade, which I think also helps to explain some
differences.
My criticism of 'generational difference' applies more to the tendency
to generalize across different groups and experiences to a
generation-as-a-whole.
Yes, Marty, I've been going on too long. I'm beginning to feel I'm
getting more writing done here than on my book, so I will sign off for a
while. Still, this stuff is highly pertinent to my present project, so
it does suck me in. Someone (Robert?) raised the question about
antiwar-WTO protest parallels. I have an article coming out in fall
Radical History Review on "From Virtual Community to Virtual History:
Mass Media and the American Antiwar Movement of the 1960s" that visits
several of these issues and raises the question about 'lessons' for the
anti-globalization movement (which I very much think is where the
continuing struggle for democracy & empowerment is focused). Perhaps
some folks might be interested in it. I think RHR will have it on its
web site:
http://chnm.gmu.edu/rhr/rhr.htm.
Also, perhaps some of you would have some interest in reading some of
the stuff I'm currently writing & giving me feedback.... I would be
interested in that, so let me know off the list at epm2@lehigh.edu.
Signing off!
Ted
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