>
> But the Air Force was planning a massive construction of bases and buildup
> well before any Gulf of Tonkin incident or resolution - they did not admit
> that, but it was their intention and was built into their planning - my
> father-in-law was in Air Force plans at the time, and he noted (after the
> fact) that the AF commitment in SE Asia was hardly a surprise given what
> they had been planning by the very early 1960s if not before - perhaps
> either the use or results of the use of that force surprised many - but, of
> course, why else would it be there (as a bottom line) -
> John Andrew
>
> John Andrew email: J_ANDREW@ACAD.FANDM.EDU
> Department of History fax 717-399-4413
> Franklin and Marshall College
> Lancaster, PA. 17604-3003
>
> "Fantasy Will Set You Free" - Steppenwolf
I^Òm not sure what you mean by ^ÓAir Force plans,^Ô since planning
occurred at many levels. I had no direct knowledge of planning at the
Pentagon. My feeling that the military planners were caught by surprise
is based on my assumption that research and development funds go to
those projects considered most important by Pentagon planners. I
estimated funding levels by the number of people involved and the level
of activities at Wright-Patterson AFB.
Before Gulf of Tonkin, the Air Force seemed to be planning for a Soviet
strategic attack (missiles and bombers) and ^Óconventional wars^Ô such as
W.W.II and Korea. The two threats of major concern seemed to be a
strategic air attack and a massive ground attack from Eastern Europe.
I participated in a study to determine requirements for the
bombing/navigation system to be developed for the F4C. The requirements
included such characteristics as navigation accuracy, bombing accuracy,
reliability, etc. These studies were done using a scenario that could
have represented a European ground attack.
Before Gulf of Tonkin, I participated in another study for a radar
aircraft to fly off the US East Coast. Soviet bombers flying
undetected below our ground radar was considered a major threat. This
system would have countered this threat. My assignment was to make an
estimate of how many such aircraft would be needed for protection. This
system was called AWS (Airborne Warning System).
After Gulf of Tonkin, a young captain (Jim Patton) joined our group from
a tour of duty in Vietnam. He recognized that the AWS could be used to
vector (guide) interceptor aircraft to targets in Vietnam. We renamed
the system AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and funding was
stepped up.
I don^Òt know whether AWACS was ever used in Vietnam. I left Air Force
employment in 1965 to work for Hughes Aircraft. Because I was no longer
working on the AWACS project, the security system prevented me from
getting information about AWACS. I didn't have a "need to know." I
then left the so-called defense industry in the early 70^Òs to return to
school.
Richard Waddell