20.145 defining humanities computing

               Humanist Discussion Group, Vol. 20, No. 145.
       Centre for Computing in the Humanities, King's College London
  www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/humanities/cch/research/publications/humanist.html
                        www.princeton.edu/humanist/
                     Submit to: humanist_at_princeton.edu

   [1] From: kr538_at_uni-bremen.de (22)
         Subject: Re: 20.143 defining humanities computing

   [2] From: Richard Cunningham (245)
                 <richard.cunningham_at_acadiau.ca>
         Subject: Re: 20.143 defining humanities computing

   [3] From: lachance_at_origin.chass.utoronto.ca (Francois (36)
                 Lachance)
         Subject: justification and definition re 20.138

--[1]------------------------------------------------------------------
         Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2006 06:55:45 +0100
         From: kr538_at_uni-bremen.de
         Subject: Re: 20.143 defining humanities computing

Willard,

the distinction between a "pragmatic" or a "strategic" approach to
defining humanities computing, that has evolved in this discussion,
is not without importance. Aristotle (NE 1140 a) distinguishes
between acting (praxis) and producing (poiesis) on the basis that
action has its goal within itself, whereas production uses tools and
aims at making a work of art (Gen. An. 740 b). Therefore, he places
art and technics within poiesis (MM 1197 a), because it is a
productive behavior combined with a true notion of its actions (meta
alethous logou poietike hexis, NE 1140 a). Art or technics is more
than (pragmatic) action by experience, because the architect is able
to teach the principles and reasons of his doings. Consequently, art
or technics is knowledge or science (episteme) (Met. 981 b).
Interestingly enough, Plato agrees in writing that art (techne) rules
and governs of what it is an art (Pol. 342 C).

There can be no doubt, then, that any definition of humanities
computing or the digital humanities will have to say which are their
principles and reasons as well as which "work of art" they are going
to produce, if we do not want to fall back behind the classics. Of
course, rhetoric is the art of the spoken word and it aims at gaining
the victory in dialogue and defining the dispositives of
institutional discourse.

Hartmut

--[2]------------------------------------------------------------------
         Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2006 06:56:24 +0100
         From: Richard Cunningham <richard.cunningham_at_acadiau.ca>
         Subject: Re: 20.143 defining humanities computing

Willard,

On the question of "strategy" or "pragmatism," I find myself cast in
the uncomfortable position of advocate of the former term. I'm
uncomfortable with this position not so much because of the
limitations (which you've only just begun to elucidate) of
"strategy," but because I have long been and still am as much a
pragmatist as need be (a very pragmatic formulation, I think).

It occurred to me after I wrote that Eagleton himself was very
likely, in the mid-80s when he wrote Lit. Theory: An Introduction, an
anti-pragmatist. Nonetheless, what he has to say in his chapter
"Conclusion: Political Criticism" has moments of clarity that make
the case for "strategy" quite compellingly. I think I'll let others
consult that source if they are interested in doing so, because I
doubt I could do it justice, and because of my discomfort in
advocating, even devilishly, against pragmatic practice.

On your question about the "rhetoric of" movement, perhaps more of an
impulse, I would say that the study of and through rhetoric remains
very strong in the US, much stronger than many of us who live outside
the US academy realize. It regained strength in the early 1970s,
(after losing a lot of ground circa 1920s when Dep'ts of Speech
Communication arose to address exactly that area, an area which their
advocates felt was going un- or at best under-represented in Dep't of
English / Literature) and has stayed strong since--with ebbs and
flows, of course.

I think I'd like to come clean at this point and declare myself very
much a non-supporter of the "rhetoric of" movement. This may help
readers decide how far they want to trust my assessment of the
movement. I have in mind Rockwell & McTavish's argument about
"thinking through" multimedia when I say that the "rhetoric of"
movement was a bad idea from the outset. It declares itself,
immediately, as treating rhetoric as an appendage to a body rather
than an integral system within the body. To be fair, there's a long
history to this point of view (I think of William Gilbert's Preface
to his 1600 text De Magnete, in which he claims his argument will
have none of the graces of rhetoric but will leave readers to
consider only the thing itself) but when supposed advocates of
rhetorical study and practice adopt this
one-size-fits-all-after-all-its-only-clothing position then who needs
enemies--real or imagined.

When rhetoric serves as a way of "thinking through" a practice,
rather than as an after thought designed to help practitioners "sell"
their practice or their results to a larger audience, then it
affects, from the outset, the practice itself. "Rhetoric of"
assumed, without, it seemed to me and others, even acknowledging its
own assumption, that science existed prior to and independently of
rhetoric. As both are deeply imbedded elements of the cultural soup
in which both scientists and non-scientists swim everyday of their
lives, I find it an unlikely assertion that a practitioner, i.e. a
scientist, could "do" science without simultaneously doing, i.e.
practicing, rhetoric. If we take as a bare minimum the definition
that rhetoric is the art of persuasion, then we ought to acknowledge
that long before the scientific community tries to persuade the
larger culture of the value of, say, splitting an atom, some
scientists have had to persuade other scientists of that value, and
of the legitimacy of their approach. More potently, though, each
scientist has had to confront the question of what serves as
legitimate evidence; in other words "what will convince me that
practice x will lead to result y" perhaps even before confronting the
question of "is result y desirable?" which again requires (self-?)persuasion.

I'm not a fan of naming authors and scholars who I think have erred
in their practice, largely because the printed word so often outlives
the author's advocacy of what she's said. So rather than directing
you to any "rhetoric of" scholarship, permit me to recommend a book
on rhetoric in science that avoids the pitfalls I've just touched on
and that was produced during the period when others were obeying the
"of" impulse. Richard Doyle's On Beyond Living: Rhetorical
Transformations of the Life Sciences is a great example of how to
look at rhetoric AND science.

Cheers,
Richard

At 04:59 AM 8/9/2006, you wrote:

> Humanist Discussion Group, Vol. 20, No. 143.
> Centre for Computing in the Humanities, King's College London
> www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/humanities/cch/research/publications/humanist.html
> www.princeton.edu/humanist/
> Submit to: humanist_at_princeton.edu
>
>
>
> Date: Wed, 09 Aug 2006 08:55:25 +0100
> From: Willard McCarty <willard.mccarty_at_kcl.ac.uk>
> >
>Richard et al,
>
>I am reminded of a wonderful article by Monroe Beardsley, "On the
>creation of art", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 23.3
>(1965): 291-304. He argues for a version of the creative process in
>which every stage powerfully affects the succeeding one -- in which
>each action of the artist, between the incept of the work and the
>final touch, sets up demands and suggestions as to what may come next
>and places limits on what can. Once the work is underway, he writes,
>it is carried along by tension between what's been done and what
>might have been done, leaving deficiencies and unrealized
>possibilities. He cites an example from poetry: "as the poet moves
>from stage to stage, it is not that he is looking to see whether he
>is saying what he already meant, but that he is looking to see
>whether he wants to mean what he is saying." This is the sort of
>process, of discovery-invention, that I had in mind. It's pragmatic
>in that the practice comes first, reflection on it second, except
>that strong reflection persists and survives to guide further practice.
>
>"Strategy" etymologically is the craft of the strategos, military
>general. Military history, I suspect, would show that successful
>generalship closely resembles the creative process described by
>Beardsley, though the good general may have more of a plan than the
>good artist. I doubt that an experienced general depends only on his
>or her intuition. Difficult to generalize (pun unforeseen but
>accepted). I do prefer the resonances of "practice", however.
>
>Perhaps you can tell me if the "rhetoric of" movement might have had
>greater success if it had made better use of the prepositional force
>of its programme (i.e., rhetoric *of* the subjects in which it
>occurs) and then synthesized its instances into a methodological
>commons, or perhaps just called itself "rhetoric". There's more than
>enough in the subject of rhetoric to keep many of us busy for a long
>time. The background is fascinating. See Ray Frazer, "The origin of
>the term 'image'", ELH 27.2 (1960): 149-61, which fell across my
>path recently.
>
>Yours,
>WM
>
>At 07:00 08/08/2006, you wrote:
> > Humanist Discussion Group, Vol. 20, No. 141.
> > Centre for Computing in the Humanities, King's College London
> > www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/humanities/cch/research/publications/humanist.html
> > www.princeton.edu/humanist/
> > Submit to: humanist_at_princeton.edu
> >
> >
> >
> > Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2006 06:31:34 +0100
> > From: Richard Cunningham <richard.cunningham_at_acadiau.ca>
> > >
> >Willard,
> >
> >I've just re-read a few chapters of Terry Eagleton's Literary Theory:
> >An Introduction in preparation for a class I'll teach this fall, and
> >in it (I think it's in the final chapter) Eagleton argues for a
> >strategic approach to literary criticism rather than an aesthetic or
> >explicitly theoretical (e.g. deconstructive or Marxist)
> >approach. Perhaps "strategic" is simply a synonym for pragmatic, but
> >perhaps it is slightly more. It implies having a goal in mind from
> >the outset (in the mind of the one who deploys the theory, practices
> >the criticism, advocates the [huco] approach) whereas pragmatic
> >implies causing some action, some change, in the world, but perhaps
> >not so clearly focused an effect as is implied by "strategic." I'm
> >not sure, but I know I've heard more intelligent people than me speak
> >against pragmatism and wonder if this is (still?) a wide-spread
> >attitude. In the event someone were to object to taking a pragmatic
> >view of humanities computing, might we suggest a strategic view?
> >
> >A strategic view of humanities computing might include "historians do
> >better history as a result" of using huco methods and asking huco
> >questions, etc, without stopping there. It could also include,
> >briefly I hope, justification of the field and its relationship to
> >academic disciplines (scientific, social scientific, humanistic,
> >professional), technology, humanity, and post-humanity. I would urge
> >that the justificatory impulse be brief because I remember what a
> >farce the "rhetoric of" move became in the US during the 1990s (it
> >seems to have run its course, but I may just have mercifully fallen
> >out of touch). There was a spate of conference sessions and papers
> >and books on the rhetoric of science, the rhetoric of architecture,
> >the rhetoric of technical documents, etc, as though rhetoric could
> >systematically be reduced to form and separated from the content of
> >science, architecture, technical communication, etc.
> >
> >Humanities computing is not, it seems to me, just a different way to
> >do history (to continue with the same example), although it is that;
> >rather, an historian who is also a computing humanist thinks as well
> >as works differently; she asks different questions and seeks
> >different information and synthesizes that different information
> >differently. If we were to ponder the pragmatics of the huco
> >historian's work, would we think about what she does and ask the same
> >questions as we would if we were to ponder her strategy? If she were
> >to approach her work strategically, the questions she asks and the
> >approach(es) she takes might be determined by the goals she sets
> >herself, whereas if she were to approach it pragmatically she might
> >limit her concern to the possibility of completing her research
> >within a specific time frame, or budget, or--and this strikes me as
> >unsettling--she might simply satisfy herself with producing a (i.e.
> >any) result.
> >
> >Or am I myself guilty of devaluing pragmatism, and simply splitting
> >hairs as a result?
> >
> >Cheers,
> >Richard
> >
> >At 04:54 AM 8/7/2006, you wrote:
> >
> > > Humanist Discussion Group, Vol. 20, No. 138.
> > > Centre for Computing in the Humanities, King's College London
> > >
> www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/humanities/cch/research/publications/humanist.html
> > > www.princeton.edu/humanist/
> > > Submit to: humanist_at_princeton.edu
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Date: Sun, 06 Aug 2006 10:03:16 +0100
> > > From: Willard McCarty <willard.mccarty_at_kcl.ac.uk>
> > > >
> > >The philosopher F. H. Bradley, in "Association and Thought", Mind
> > >12.47 (1887): 354, arguing in a footnote with the editor of that
> > >journal about how to define "a psychical fact or event" in the
> > >empirical science of psychology, declares that
> > >
> > > >A definition in psychology is for me a working definition. It is not
> > > >expected to have more truth than is required for practice in its
> > > >science; and if when pressed beyond it contradict itself, that is
> > > >quite immaterial.
> > >
> > >Giving his definition, he then observes,
> > >
> > > >We see here the impotence of empirical science to justify its
> > > >principles theoretically.
> > >
> > >-- not because this or any other empirical science is inherently
> > >inferior, but because in his view metaphysics has no place in it.
> > >But what then justifies such a field is its results, which in the
> > >case of psychology is a better understanding of how and why humans
> > >do what they do, and not only or primarily why we shop for
> > >particular products or any other such thing to which psychology
> > >might be applied. If humanities computing is an empirical field -- I
> > >won't say "science" for obvious reasons -- then by analogy its
> > >justification cannot be how and why it is that, say, historians do
> > >better history as a result, but how and why scholarly enquiry is
> > >different -- better, perhaps, but certainly different -- across all
> > >the humanities (by which the historians' improved performance may be
> > >explained). Not a metaphysical but a pragmatic philosophy?
> > >
> > >Yours,
> > >WM
> > >
> > >
> > >Dr Willard McCarty | Reader in Humanities Computing | Centre for
> > >Computing in the Humanities | King's College London | Kay House, 7
> > >Arundel Street | London WC2R 3DX | U.K. | +44 (0)20 7848-2784 fax:
> > >-2980 || willard.mccarty_at_kcl.ac.uk www.kcl.ac.uk/humanities/cch/wlm/
>
>
>Dr Willard McCarty | Reader in Humanities Computing | Centre for
>Computing in the Humanities | King's College London | Kay House, 7
>Arundel Street | London WC2R 3DX | U.K. | +44 (0)20 7848-2784 fax:
>-2980 || willard.mccarty_at_kcl.ac.uk www.kcl.ac.uk/humanities/cch/wlm/

--[3]------------------------------------------------------------------
         Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2006 06:57:54 +0100
         From: lachance_at_origin.chass.utoronto.ca (Francois Lachance)
         Subject: justification and definition re 20.138

Willard,

In your set of questions emanating from your quotation of F.H.
Bradley, the theme of justification looms.

> applied. If humanities computing is an empirical field -- I won't say
> "science" for obvious reasons -- then by analogy its justification
> cannot be how and why it is that, say, historians do better history
> as a result, but how and why scholarly enquiry is different --
> better, perhaps, but certainly different -- across all the humanities
> (by which the historians' improved performance may be explained). Not
> a metaphysical but a pragmatic philosophy?

You seem to be suggesting justification by works (results).

Might I be so bold and propose justification by grace?

As you might suspect I am not hankering after a theological
underpinning. I am inviting you and the readers
of Humanist to consider how grace of a materialist nature might be
experienced. Grace in the sense of
style. And style of course betokens not only method but also
application. Application as a "fit" between
means and ends. Style in game playing. For indeed humanities
computing involves in certain regards the
playing, the serious playing, of games. To use the machine (the
stupid computer and its brute
counting force) is analogous to limiting oneself to the use of clubs
in the game of golf or rackets in the
game of tennis. [This line of thought courtesy of Bernard Suits
(_Grasshopper_) -- more of which in a
future missive.)

So again, it is style taken to mean the application of method to
certain ends that would mark humanities
computing as special and hence worthy of justification. Those ends?
Why the beautiful playing of games!
Regardless of results. A failure in desired outcomes is not a failure
of beautiful play.

-- 
Francois Lachance, Scholar-at-large
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~lachance/jardin
~~~ to be surprised by machines: wistly and sometimes wistfully